INTRODUCTION
Views on the influence of the Internet on civic and political life in democratic regimes differ. At the extremes one can point to pessimists who see it as a danger to democracy (Morozov, 2013) and optimists who view it as the means to regenerate political life (Coleman & Gøtze, 2001) . Less extreme versions of these dystopian and utopian views are the mobilization or equalization and normalization or reinforcement hypotheses. Both sides of the argument follow a more inductive and empiricist logic with the former setting out the idea that the internet brings new and less well represented voices into the political process, while the latter sees that the Internet changes very little and if anything may be reinforcing the position of the more powerful and resource rich. Both sets of conceptsequalization/mobilization and normalization/reinforcement -have now been tested in a range of studies at both elite and mass level. In the course of this paper we seek to apply them to the case of the French 2007 and 2012 Presidential election.
The two previous French presidential elections provide an ideal opportunity to test these two interpretations of the internet's role in the developed democracy from elites' and citizens' perspective.
First, from the perspective of digital campaigning, France has been seen as among the more advanced nations in candidates uses of the technology at the national level, despite a rather cautious start. At the beginning of the 21 st century Internet use was still quite low among the general public. This was in part due to the popularity of Minitel, a popular French-origin network that preceded the Web and allowed for information searching and exchange of the messages among users. This reticence was mirrored among In institutional terms the French system also presents a highly compelling case for analyzing the adoption of, and public attention to internet campaigning. The semi-presidential political system demands a highly visible and personalised style of electoral campaigning that is similar to the American presidential campaign. Such characteristics have been seen as helping to accelerate the adoption of the new campaign techniques in contrast to the slower party-centric parliamentary or Westminster style model (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008) . Moreover one important area of contrast to the U.S. lies in the more limited finances available to candidates. French law imposes ceilings on expenditures permitted in elections, and resources available to candidates depend on the supporting party financing, and due to the state reimbursement, also to the number of votes obtained 2 . While this may slow down some of the advances in the use of most cutting edge techniques it also provides for a more genuinely multi-candidate system and a spread of varying financial resources that means a test of the normalization vs. mobilization 1 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2?page=2 2 For the 2012 presidential election, limits were €16.9 million for the candidates present in the first round and €22.5 million for those present in both rounds,. Sponsorship from corporations is not allowed. The campaign is financed by the party, donations collected from the individuals and state reimbursement. All candidates are eligible to be reimbursed by the state for their campaign spending according to the number of votes obtained (with the amounts depending on whether the party got more or less than 5% of votes. For more details: http://www.viepublique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/fonctionnement/president-republique/comment/comment-estfinancee-campagne-electorale.html (accessed June 2013) argument becomes more meaningful (see Vedel & Cann, 2008) 3 . A further helpful trait of French Presidential elections in this context is that they generate substantial attention and interest among voters.
In the first round of the 2007 and 2012 Presidential election 84% and 79.5% of the French electorate respectively cast their vote. 4 Candidates thus have a strong incentive to ensure they present an appealing and highly visible web presence.
Finally in practical terms this study expands the literature by widening the geographic focus to cover a nation that despite its increasing prominence in the arena of digital campaigning has not been the subject of much systematic analysis. The fact that we compare and profile changes in candidate and citizen online activism across two election periods adds an important over time element to the analysis that allows us to undertake a more in-depth look at the questions normalization vs mobilization. We Were smaller players managing to compete with their major counterparts in terms of the quality of the web campaigns they were able to provide (mobilization), or did the latter simply dwarf their efforts and dominate the debate (normalization)? We then profile levels of online political engagement and the drivers behind citizen involvement in the e-campaign. We do so using two cross-sectional survey data sets that measure traditional types of online engagement via web-participation as an index (eengagement) for 2007 and 2012) and what we term an 'e2-engagement' index that is based on social media activity and applies only to 2012. We conceptualize the 'e-engagement' as the traditional online activities, most often practiced through websites. The 'e2-engagement' represents those forms of activities which are performed through platforms (social network sites) which require a more structured 3 Most of the presidential candidates or parties supporting them were present online already in 2002 when only one out of fifteen candidates did not declare any expenses for the online platforms (Vedel & Cann, 2008) . 4 The tendency of the high participation in Presidential elections is rather stable among French citizens. Turnout: 2002 72% in the first round and 80% in the second round; 1995 78% and 80%; 1988 81% and 84%; 1981 81% and 86%; 1974 84% and 87%; 1969 78% and 69%; 1965 85% and 84%. 6 Foot et al., 2007; Colombo et al., 2012; Vergeer et al., 2013a, b; Vaccari, 2013) are still rare.
In the course of these analyses something of a consensus has emerged that the dominant trend in political actors' adaptation to the new media is the normalization or 'politics as usual' thesis (Resnik, 1998; Margolis & Resnick, 2000) . For parties this is demonstrated typically by analyses of their web presence and site content which show that minor parties and candidates are less frequently online, and when they are, have a less sophisticated presence and lower visibility TkachKawasaki, 2003; Xenos & Foot, 2005; Kluver et al., 2007; Schweitzer, 2005 Schweitzer, , 2008 Schweitzer, , 2011 Vaccari, 2008; .
More recently the possibility of a return to the mobilization scenario with the rise of web 2.0 or social media tools has been highlighted (Gueorguieva, 2007; Kalnes, 2009; Strandberg, 2013) . Social media and particularly SNS provide a more organizational and activist resource through which smaller parties can build a support base and larger network than would be possible offline to spread their message. As Chadwick (2012) has argued the social media environment may be fostering a new 'a lowthreshold communication environment' and a new breed of virtual opinion leaders that help in transmitting political attitudes, both offline and online (Norris & Curtice, 2008) . Recent empirical work conducted in Australia (Gibson & McAllister, 2014) supports this idea in that while the two major parties were more visible through personal websites, candidates from the Greens were more active via social media and importantly, appeared to gain some electoral advantage from their use of these newer social media technologies.
Based on these findings from the literature on web campaigning from the 'supply' side perspective we set out the following three research questions to be examined The final question is more analytical and draws the findings together from the first two to address the core question of the paper:
RQ3: To what extent does the content and quality of candidates online presence across the two elections show support for normalization or mobilization at the elite level?
Political participation and the internet
Almost two decades of research on the effects of internet use on individual political and civic behavior have now been conducted with little sign of a consensus being reached. A number of studies have raised significant doubts about the mobilization potential of the internet, identifying instead a pattern of normalization akin to that noted above among elites whereby the already engaged are becoming even further empowered (Bimber, 1999 (Bimber, , 2001 (Bimber, , 2013 Scheufele & Niesbet, 2002; Norris, 2003; Prior, 2005; Hindman, 2009) . Contradictory evidence supporting the mobilization thesis has also been presented however. Internet use, measured simply as access (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003; Kroh & Neiss, 2012) or more specifically as searching for political information and engaging in online discussion (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Esser & de Vreese, 2007) has been shown to have positive influences on electoral participation. Reflecting this mixed set of results Boulianne (2009) in her meta-research on 39 studies of the Internet's impact on political engagement concluded that while overall the literature has pointed to a positive effect, it is only very small.
Following the findings of the elite level studies noted above, the arrival of web.2.0 has renewed speculation that the medium will promote a mobilization of less well engaged and resourced individuals into the mainstream and produce 'less socioeconomically stratified participation' (Jorba & Bimber, 2012) . This is supported by recent work by Smith, Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2009) and Smith (2013) who found that despite a persistent power of socio-demographic variables in explaining more traditional or 'converted' types of online participation in the U.S such as contacting or donating, that these gaps were less visible for political activities engaged in via social network sites. Other research has found that this newer type of social media based activism forms a distinctive type of 'e-expressive' participation (Rojas et al, 2005) and moreover that those drawn toward are generally younger, less interested and active in mainstream politics (Koc-Michalska & Vedel, 2013 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Elite level analysis
The first section of the analysis focuses on elite use of the web and social media in the two most recent French Presidential elections. Our data source were presidential candidates' websites during the 2007 and 2012 electoral cycle. We applied a content coding scheme derived from that developed by Gibson and Ward (2000) and commonly used for the description of electoral campaigns for elections of different levels or representatives' online presence Conway & Donard, 2004; Schweitzer, 2005 Schweitzer, , 2008 Schweitzer, , 2011 Foot & Schneider, 2006; Vaccari, 2008; , 2014 also the extent to which smaller or larger parties were expanding and improving the basic content of their web campaigns. We can also compare normalization in their web.2.0 use and whether it appears to be giving the edge to minor or major parties.
Mass-level Analysis
The second part of the paper examines the question of normalization or mobilization at the citizen level and uses data from two pre-election online surveys conducted by Dependent Variables (see Appendix Table 2 for full details of question wording): The dependent variable is online political engagement and it is measured in two ways: (1) an additive index measuring a range of traditional online political actions which we label 'e-engagement' that is calculated for 2007 and 2012;
and (2) an additive index of web.2.0 online political actions that we term 'e2-engagement' and measure only in 2012. The first e-engagement index consisted of seven activities and scores ranged from zero to seven -the political activities included are shown in Table 3 In using two indices we are making a distinction between conventional types of online political engagement and more recently developed socially interactive forms. The idea that e-participation is multidimensional is one that has been gaining increasing theoretical and empirical support in the literature (Saglie & Vabo, 2009; Rojas et al. 2009 ). Hoffman (2012) for example has argued that online engagement is two dimensional, constituting both participation and communication. Studies that can examine this more nuanced approach, however, are quite rare since they require a rich data source with multiple indicators of online political activities
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. Most studies to date have through necessity relied on a limited number of individual measures of online engagement such as e-petition or e-contacting (Anduiza et al., 2010) or constructed a uni-dimensional index that adds these actions together (Best & Krueger, 2005; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011; Gibson et al., 2010) . As with our elite study in this analysis we adopt a middle ground in that we use two aggregated indices rather than individual measures. While one loses some of the plurality of the online experience through these aggregated measures they do capture a more general propensity to engage in online politics and smooth out any possible anomalies or spikes in activity caused by external 'shocks' such as a high profile online petition. Because our dependent 12 variables are counts and not likely to follow a linear distribution we examine them using a Poisson regression models (Wooldridge, 2001) .
Independent Variables: A range of key drivers of political engagement in general and online engagement more specifically are included as independent variables. These include measures of socio-demographic status that capture individuals' resources and capacity to participate (Verba et al., 1995; Anduiza et al., 2010 ) such as gender, age, education, income and class (for full details see Appendix, Table 2 ). In addition a range of political attitudes linked to a propensity to participate in politics (Chiche & Haegel 2002; Belanger et al. 2012 ) are included such as political interest (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Nie et al., 1996; Bréchon, 2006 ) , whether one discusses politics (Mayer 2010) , satisfaction with democracy (Kenski & Stroud 2006; Wang 2007) ., party proximity and ideological identification (Campbell et al. 1960; Vassallo, 2010) .
We add a number control for individuals' media exposure including their exposure to other mainstream media, i.e. print, television, online and radio information sources
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. We also measure their online experience through a combination of variables that measure the frequency and longitude of the Internet experience. This involved a three part categorization of individuals as historical, recent or new
Internet users based on whether they had used the Internet for more than seven years and twelve years respectively in 2007 and 2012, from five to seven years, and less than five and seven years. The categories were then further split based on whether an individual used the Internet frequently i.e. more than one time per day in each of the three conditions. The variables were combined to create a category of Given the quite substantial difference in the investment made by the two main candidates in their online campaigns and the final election results, it would appear on face value that the web did not decisively affect their fate. However, that said it is of course also possible that Hollande was simply more strategic in this deployment of the technology than Sarkozy and targeted his efforts more efficiently. The results show that in both years campaigns were focused more on information than interaction. During the 2007 elections 42% of candidates offered the possibility to comment and 25% to debate on their own website. One exception to this was Ségolène Royal who developed a purpose-built highly sophisticated social networking platform. By 2012 interaction via homepages was even more limited with 30% of candidates permitting comments but none provided space for web-based debate. Despite this decreasing enthusiasm for debate, there was a push by some candidates to create some kind of community portal rather than offer more personalized home pages. Sarkozy created a supporter site based on his campaign slogan -la France forte -and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (supported by the coalition of the left wing parties and associations) set up placeaupeople2012.fr (on the side of his well-established blog). The fringe left wing candidates Poutou (NPA) and Arthaud (LO) both appeared to spend very little on online campaigning and did not appear to have a clear online strategy other than maintaining a simple presence.
Frequent Historical users (FH), Frequent Recent users (FR) and Frequent New users (FN
The candidate of the extreme-right Marine Le Pen definitely put more emphasis on online performance than her forerunner in 2007. She was extensively using her website to promote information and her ideas, and employed social media platforms for debates among critics and supporters (apparently without strong moderation of the comments). During both campaigns generally all candidates performed better on information provision than on interaction and engagement indices --both scores have decreased in 2012.
The exception is technological development of the websites, element of campaign professionalization, which has slightly increased in 2012 (.700 in comparison to .667 in 2007), and this increase is mostly due to a visible change within the fringe candidates' performance, who as the only group improved in this category in time.
In 2007 Table 1 ).
In 2007 it was Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal that ran the most sophisticated campaign.
The former used an innovative movie-based website and the latter created her own social network platform for internal and external debating (Désirs d'avenir). Francois Bayrou created probably the most interactive website-based platform allowing for comments and online debating. In 2012 there was no definite leader, as most of the candidates had a similar website architecture, with pop-ups (mostly to collect e-mail addresses), interestingly arranged information about local campaigning and contacts (visualized with the googlemap tool), offering the possibility to volunteer offline and online (a 'kit for volunteers'), links to social media platforms and the opportunity to share, print and download page content.
While the fall in interactivity on candidates' personal homepages may reflect an increasing reluctance of candidates to engage in dialogue with French voters, it is likely also to be related to the increased use of web.2.0 tools. By 2012 as Table 3 shows, interactivity were more commonly found on social media platforms. Table 3 reports the results for each candidate on AOP of the web.2.0 index. Overall, therefore, in the results of our elite level analysis would appear to raise something of a challenge to the normalization thesis in that candidates for the minor parties now offer content that is as rich as that offered by those from major parties. That said, the mobilization thesis cannot be fully confirmed as fringe candidates still lag behind those with better resources. In addition these findings are limited to a national and very high profile race. Results for the local candidates of minor parties in parliamentary elections may present a rather different and less competitive story.
French Internet users and their engagement in the campaign
We move now to examine our next set of research questions about the normalization and mobilization percentage points (for the details please see Table 3 in Appendix). Table 4 deals with RQ4 and presents some basic frequencies of the various types of activity we measured over time using our e-engagement If we then examine these findings with RQ5 in mind, i.e. the factors driving this use we can see that some changes occur across the two election cycles. Table 5 By 2012 in contrast we find that demographic effects have all but disappeared. Not surprisingly attitudinal variables such as interest in politics, having a partisan identification and a propensity to discuss politics exert a positive effect on political engagement cross-time and cross indexes. However, satisfaction with democracy is a negative predictor in 2012, so those who were less pleased with how the French political system performed were more likely to be looking for political information online. Party identification is a strong predictor for traditional e-engagement (in contrary to e2-engagement, see below). Those leaning towards any party are more willing to engage than those who cannot place themselves within any party system programs. On the contrary to the expectations based on the fact that French Internet users tend to be more left-wing oriented (see discussion above), political and ideological views have no significant effect on online political behaviour. The effects of media exposure are somewhat predictable in that a preference for the Internet as the first source of political information is a positive predictor of all types of online engagement in both years. However, the effect of reading newspapers is interesting in that it has no effect in 2007 but by 2012 becomes an important predictor of online engagement. Perhaps this effect is significant due to the presence of online versions of the print press (which is not considered by a part of respondents as an 'internet source'). This may be also an indicative of the growing importance of 'pure players', popular media outlets present only online (mediapart.fr, huffingtonpost.fr, rue89.fr) in delivering high quality information and investigative journalism covering political scandals. It is possible that the general trend of information consumption may have influenced peoples' predisposition for performing other online activities than searching for news. Or, on the contrary, there is a pure effect of print version reading of the national and regional press, which gathers a specific audience with a high level of political interest and engagement. Finally, the results show that as one would expect, our variable capturing individuals' levels of internet experience and familiarity is significant, those using the Internet for longer and most frequently are in general more likely to perform online political activities. Although the effect of this prior experience seems to decline over time.
For e2-engagement, a similar and even more notable pattern emerges in regard to demographic predictors as for e-engagement in 2012. Age is the strongest determinant and its effect runs in a negative direction, younger people tend to engage more in web.2.0 based political activities. Attitudinally a similar pattern emerges in that interest in politics and discussion are positive but dissatisfaction with democracy appears to be an even stronger driver for e2-engagement. Partisan identification, however, is not significant for e2-engagement, suggesting that political participation via social network sites may be drawing in those who feel less attached to the traditional, institutional offline political sphere and who are looking for new forms of political expression, .
In the final two columns of Table 5 , we present the analysis with additional control variables that were available only for 2012. This includes level of individuals' offline political engagement and party involvement. The addition of these variables points to some interesting relationships between offline and online forms of engagement. While offline political engagement is strongly correlated with traditional eengagement, however it does not predict e2-engagment. More surprisingly, however, is that the latter is strongly linked to undertaking voluntary work for a party and donating money to parties. This finding is intriguing in that it suggests that those political active in online social networks are also particularly active in working for parties. So as well as attracting younger individuals, habitually not associated with politics. Table 5 around here please
To check for the robustness of our findings on traditional online political e-engagement (Table 5) Overall, therefore our results do confirm a shift in the drivers for online engagement in the election campaign with a move toward greater diversity in the participant pool in terms of their political experience and background. Essentially in answer to RQ6 there is evidence of a mobilization effect, particularly for the newer social media or 'e2' types of activity.
Supply and demand
When analyzing the uses of the internet during electoral campaigns, it is important to capture both the supply and the demand sides. How citizens use the internet for political purpose depends in part of the online strategies implemented by candidates. Reciprocally, parties and candidates try to adapt their online strategies to users' behavior and demands.
However, the attempt to compile together the two sides of the communication process -supply and demand side -is extremely difficult and has important limitations. The most important obstacle is probably the methodological difficulty to achieve similar level of accuracy in both approaches. The content analysis phase does not superimpose any limitations of features to examine; on the contrary survey research is restrained by the numbers of questions and items to be enumerated. Thus the juxtaposition of the two sides would always have a limitation and lack the exact match.
Our study indicates that candidates in Presidential elections tend to fulfill (maybe even excessively) the expectations of their audiences, their dominant web strategy is to supply the information (IP strategy, Table 2 ) which match with the most often performed activity of the Internet users, as one third of them search more profound information about elections (Table 3 ). In 2012 among those who searched for political information about elections 42% also visited candidates' websites and 32% got such information through social network (however we did not controlled for the source). Candidates seem to quite well read the expectations among audiences and strategically deliver the most sought features. Fairly popular among the Internet users online video watching (22% in 2012) is well served by the candidates (9 out of 10 propose them on websites and 6 on video sharing sites), on the contrary less popular active participation (debating online on chat or forums, 7%) is delivered by minority of candidates (3 out of 10).
Similarly the performance of candidates on social network platforms is rather intense, with firm majority present and constantly updating their Facebook and Twitter account. However only one fifth of the French Internet users performed political activities -passive or active -on social networks. The relation seems unbalanced with high performance of the political actors and rather weak possible response from the audience. The social network presence is rather a 'must be' for the political actors and the occasion to reach special group of citizens (younger, those less participating in more conventional types of political engagement and somehow partisan, see Table 5 ) than the opportunity to meet a vast majority of the society. At the mass level, our study also presented a challenge to the idea of normalization. Internet use is widespread and the medium has become an important source of political information. Education and other socio-economic factors are largely irrelevant as drivers to this type of activity. And while it is the case that those who are more interested in politics and closer to political parties are more likely to seek out information online, the medium also attracts those with less of a stake in the system. In particular the 2012 electoral cycle witnessed the birth of new online public sphere -social networking platforms -with an audience that is definitely younger, does not feel well served by the current democratic system, and are not participating in offline conventional political activities. For such individuals, entry into politics might not take place through the established modes of offline activities or even more regular types of website activities but through social network platforms -among them most popular Facebook or Twitterresending, posting or passively coming across political messages dispatched by political actors or by their friends.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the direction of travel of research on mobilization and normalization discussed earlier these findings are significant. Essentially our findings take one of the more high profile national online campaigns which one might argue can serve as a bell weather for future trends and shows that pessimism over the potential of the web to open up campaign communication and election engagement may be misplaced. In particular if we look beyond the idea that the web's power is to be judged primarily as a means of vote generation to one of organizational infrastructure and resource generation then it does seem that it has important redistribute qualities. This seems particularly true in relation to the use of social media and web.2.0 platforms. This redistribution or mobilization effect also seems to emerge at the citizen level with the typical gap in resources between participants and non-participants appearing to recede in the most recent election and particularly with regard to patterns of e2-engagement. The extent to which these findings can be generalized beyond the French case is of course subject to future empirical analysis. The results, however, do confirm those from Australia regarding the greater enthusiasm of Green candidates for social media online tools in recent campaigns. In terms of citizen involvement, again the idea that social media are mobilizing younger and less typically interested individuals in election campaigns is in line with recent findings from the UK and the U.S. As such the results provide at least some tentative support for the idea that while context matters, the latest generation of socially compatible communication technologies may be opening up a new opportunity for the less well resourced to become politically active in elections. Posted political information on own social network profile 6
Followed election on Twitter 4
Posted information about election on Twitter 2 Source: survey 'Internautes et information ' January 2007; 'Mediapolis' March 2012 (ANR 2008 , both CEVIPOF, Sciences-Po Paris. Note: 62.2% of the respondent declared having profile on any social network, 11.4% declared having Twitter account. 
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